An Analysis of the Failures of the Russian Armed Forces and the Factors that Led to its Defeat at the Battle for Kyiv 2022

Abstract:

This dissertation is an analysis on the failures of the Russian Armed Forces and the factors that led to their defeat at the Battle for Kyiv. The Battle for Kyiv proved to be one of the most influential battles of the ongoing war in Ukraine due to how close the Russian Armed Forces were to capturing the city. Literature surrounding the Battle for Kyiv typically is hyper-focused on singular areas of the battle, such as the concept of strategic depth. The importance of this battle is yet to be a mainstream topic in the sphere of military studies, this dissertation aims to change that by providing a conclusive diagnosis to the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv. Through the use of both primary and secondary sources, an accurate understanding of the reasons behind the Russian defeat at Kyiv were identified and assessed. Through research it was clear that there was a definite gap in research about the Battle for Kyiv in regard to a comprehensive analysis on why the Russians failed to succeed in their objective. This thesis found that there were two main factors that influenced the outcome of the Battle for Kyiv, these being poor strategic decisions and failures in regard to Russian military intelligence. These two factors influenced another four factors that were all reliant on the two aforementioned factors if the Kyiv offensive was to succeed. Identifying exactly why these factors are important to a successful military offensive, but also how they are relevant to the Battle for Kyiv was one of the main goals of this dissertation. These findings are significant, as they not only provide reasoning as to why the discussed factors are important, but also context to the factors that are discussed allowing a more complete understanding of the Battle for Kyiv to be achieved. 

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Table of Contents: 

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..pp 6-11

An Overview of the Key Events and Military Actions During and Before the Battle for Kyiv: ……………………………………………………………………………………………..pp 11-19

The Six Requirements for a Successful Offensive………………………………………pp 19-25

A Review of Russian Performance During the Battle for Kyiv………………………...pp 25-31

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………pp 31-33

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………….pp 34-40

Introduction:

“I decided to conduct a special military operation. Its goal is to protect people who have been subjected to bullying and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years. For this we will strive for the demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine.” - Vladimir Putin, February 24th 2022

As this address was released to the world, Russian troops surged into Ukraine from three different sides. Putin’s address plunged Europe back into a continent at war. For the first time in the 21st century, two modern militaries were facing off in the most deadly war in Europe since the second world war.  

This dissertation will analyse the factors that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv in 2022 during the initial phases of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv is a northern oblast in Ukraine that contains the capital Kyiv. An oblast is a regional division of former Soviet states, an oblast is similar in nature and size to a US state for example. The focus of this thesis will be on the militaristic factors that affected the outcome of Russia’s thrust toward the Ukrainian capital. Factors such as logistics, strategy, battlefield actions and morale can be classified as militaristic factors. This does not mean that factors that are not militaristic will be thrown aside completely, but for this dissertation, militaristic factors bear the most importance.  

Current research on the Russian invasion indicates that the failure to capture Kyiv seriously inhibited the overall ability of the Russian armed forces to achieve the goals set before their invasion began. The importance of this battle cannot be understated, this battle was the key moment during the initial phases of the Russian invasion; for both sides, victory in the Kyiv region was vital. Given that this is the first conflict of its kind since the end of the second world war, that being a conventional conflict in Europe between two modern militaries. Understanding the significance of the Battle for Kyiv and the wider conflict is vital to one who wishes to better understand geopolitics. Though callous to state, a nation’s military capability conveys a large amount of the power that that nation wields on the international stage. This conflict will shape the geopolitical stage for years to come. At the time of writing, this conflict is far from over, yet the effects are being felt all over the world. 

Of present, the battle for Kyiv concluded over a year ago, despite this, there is yet to be a written analysis on the factors that led to the Russian defeat that is formatted in a condensed and comprehensive manner, this is a clear gap in research of not only the conflict in Ukraine and the Battle for Kyiv, but also a gap in accessible content about military actions and campaigns in the modern day. This is hugely important in a time where warfare can often be glorified to the public, and misinformation spreading is at a historical high. Understanding the factors that led to the Russian defeat, will enable those reading to behold a newly developed understanding of the issues that modern militaries may face if conducting military actions on a scale similar to this example. 

Moreover, during the initial days of the war, it was generally agreed by military analysts around the world that Russia would soundly beat Ukraine within a short time frame without taking the losses that the Battle for Kyiv has become renowned for. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was thought of as a near peer power to western militaries in terms of its military capabilities as a nation, the Battle for Kyiv provided evidence that Russia’s armed forces were not as capable as previously thought. Given the misconceptions about the capability of Russia’s military, there is a space for an objective review of the Russian military’s performance in a scenario where it held considerable advantages over its adversary. 

Considering this, one of the goals this dissertation aims to achieve is to potentially inform policy on the realities and challenges of starting a large-scale conventional war against a capable and motivated foe. Alongside this, this dissertation also aims to provide a platform for those wishing to develop their understanding of the vital importance that the Battle for Kyiv has had on the outcome of this conflict. The study of this battle is extremely important for the future, ensuring that the factors that led to the Russian defeat are accurately recorded will be paramount for those in the future looking to understand the impact this battle has had on the outcome of this war. Achieving this aim would potentially play a part in an individual understanding the wider historical impact of this conflict. 

The most common argument in current literature on the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv is based around the major underestimation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by Russia. This is certainly a valid point, my initial hypothesis has identified two main factors that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv, these being the major underestimation of the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the poor choice in strategy with regard to the approach without compromise that Russia took at the Battle for Kyiv.

The literature surrounding this topic is yet to be documented at a level that could be compared to the Battle of Stalingrad for example. This is to be expected, not only is the conflict still ongoing, but the battle ended, at the time of writing, a year ago. This time frame is not suitable for constructing an analysis that covers every conceivable area of the battle and the wider implications of the result. With that being said, the research surrounding the Battle for Kyiv at this moment is typically very detailed in regard to specific areas of the battle. For example, in “Defense in Depth: The Key to Ukraine's Military Defense Strategy during the battle of Kyiv”  by Giorgi Koberidze, an assistant professor of international relations at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs conducts an analysis on the concept of strategic depth and its application during the Battle for the Kyiv region. Strategic depth is the concept of a buffer zone between the frontline of a conflict and the rear to enable for a military to conduct an effective defence. Strategic depth is hugely important for a military conducting defensive actions due to the fact that the vital components of a military’s combat power are not all lethal in nature. A good example of this is the logistical elements of a nations’ armed forces. Koberidze applies examples of the Armed Forces of Ukraine successfully implementing strategic depth into their strategy for defeating the Russian advance towards the Ukrainian capital. This can be seen in an extract from the article that reads “The Ukrainians successfully attempted to force the mass of Russian units into narrow stretches of terrain - impassable dirt roads, thawing fields or swamps that would lure vehicles and force them to consume more fuel.” This is a good example of the focus that many secondary readings of the Battle for Kyiv have on specific areas of the battle. The article is heavily focused on the concept of strategic depth, this is done well, the article addresses Ukrainian strategy very well throughout and makes very valuable arguments about the importance that strategic defence has in conducting a defensive military action. However, it does not address other militaristic factors that influenced the result of the battle. For example, morale is a militaristic factor that is not covered by Koberidze in this article. This focus on singular factors is a downfall of much of the work surrounding the Battle for Kyiv.

Another example can be seen in Russia-Ukrainian War 2022: Battle of Hostomel, a conference paper published by the University of Kiev. As the title states this is a paper solely on the Battle for Hostomel airport, which was a vital area to both sides during the Battle for Kyiv. The paper conducts an overview of the battle for the airport which had a major impact on the rest of the fight for the Kyiv oblast. The paper offers a valuable timeline of events that took place during the Battle for Hostomel airport, this is another hyper-focused area of research around the Battle for Kyiv. Although useful at its base, the paper fails to provide any deeper analysis on the significance of the military actions and their results. In this example, bias toward Ukrainian performance is a factor to be considered when reviewing this source. As the paper is published by a Ukrainian university, there may be some bias in regard to the description of the performance of the Russian forces at the Battle for Hostomel, this is most prevalent in some of the language used to describe the military actions of both sides. However, this does not take away from the overall quality of the source as an example of literature surrounding the Battle for Kyiv. 

A unique example of secondary readings on the Battle for Kyiv come in the form of daily Russian campaign assessments conducted by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). The ISW is a non-profit think tank made up of former US military and political officials that was formed to provide a trusted source of analysis and information on military affairs relevant to the United States. The ISW conducts daily Russian campaign assessments and has done since the start of the war. The campaign assessments are compiled from information that can be visually confirmed from a multitude of sources. The ISW conducted daily campaign assessments throughout the Battle for Kyiv. The assessments report on Russian military actions across the frontlines in Ukraine, due to the nature of the information, the reports are often brief due to the scale of the conflict, the Kyiv region was not the only area in Ukraine that Russia advanced into. The reports are supported by maps detailing areas of assessed fighting and Russian control allowing those viewing to gain a more complete understanding of the events taking place on the frontline that day. This is incredibly useful for piecing together different parts of the battle, the day by day reports allow for a great level of depth when the reports are studied as a group. This allows for a detailed understanding of the dynamic nature of the frontline during the Battle for Kyiv. However, the daily campaign assessments conducted by the ISW are again focused on one aspect of warfare, this time being an overview of the tactical element to the Battle for Kyiv and the wider conflict in Ukraine. 

Literature around the ongoing war in Ukraine often covers the Battle for Kyiv as a part of a larger analysis on the major events that have taken place so far throughout the entirety of the conflict. For example, in Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine February–July 2022 by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Battle for Kyiv is discussed. It is a great example of a detailed analysis of the transition that the Russian armed forces underwent a few days into the advancement toward Kyiv due to the unexpected levels of resistance that the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to produce. The report discusses the reasoning behind the Russian tactical changes especially in response to the evident failures in intelligence that plagued the Russian command during the Battle for Kyiv. This source provides a brilliant objective overview of the Russian military actions during the Battle for Kyiv and the reasoning behind them. Although the source does assume a sound understanding of military jargon, it provides an excellent insight into the failures of the Russian high command due to poor tactics and intelligence during the Battle for Kyiv. 

This project draws from both primary and secondary sources, both of which contribute to the outcome of this thesis. Primary sources come primarily in the form of news articles that document the events discussed in this dissertation, although maps of the frontline are also used to some degree. It can be a common misconception that all news sites produce correct information. This can be far from the case, this was considered throughout my research process and therefore approaching primary sources with caution was my typical approach. The bulk of the research for this dissertation was done through secondary readings, typically in the style of academic papers, journals, reports and books. One of the major challenges was the fact that the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, being cautious of misinformation was paramount throughout the research process. Both sides of the conflict used disinformation to their advantage, particularly to boost morale of both the military and civilian populations. Despite this, concerns about work about the Battle for Kyiv being classified as propaganda are typically unwarranted. Organisations such as RUSI and the ISW gain nothing from intentionally spreading misinformation. Critically analysing secondary sources was a huge part of the research process, discerning what was relevant in sources hundreds of pages long was often quite challenging. Another challenge comes from the fact that I can not speak or read Russian or Ukrainian, although there are often options that can translate sources written in the aforementioned languages, it has hindered some parts of my research. Although for my chosen topic, typically there are numerous sources written in English. 

Chapter One: 

An Overview of the Key Events and Military Actions During and Before the Battle for Kyiv:

To understand the factors that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv a general understanding of the timeline of events must be established. Without this knowledge, it would be incredibly difficult to accurately piece together a picture of the factors that led to the Russian failure to capture Kyiv and the wider Kyiv region.

To most of the world the Russian invasion of Ukraine came as a massive shock. Mainstream media did not provide much coverage of the troop build ups on the Ukrainian border, it was only a few days before the invasion began that the topic of war was introduced to the public. To Ukraine and its allies, a Russian invasion was always a possibility. Since 2014, after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the subsequent conflict in the Donbass region backed by elements of the Russian military, the prospect of an invasion has always been a threat. This can be supported by Polina Sinovets and Bettina Renz’s research paper on the changes to Russia’s military doctrine in 2014. The paper, published in December 2014, found that “Unlike in the 2010 version, cooperation with NATO is no longer regarded as a means to enforcing collective security.” Russia’s change in doctrine reflects the sentiment toward alignment with NATO and its allies, although not a direct indicator of a forthcoming invasion, Ukraine and its allies would have been very wary of this change in attitude from Putin and his government. If this was not enough, in the same doctrine change Russia makes note of the threat posed from “bordering states, whose policy threatens the interests of the Russian Federation.” This choice of language is hardly ambiguous, clearly Ukraine is the focus of this Russian change in doctrine. Given that this paper was published after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, it is clear that the change in doctrine was a means of justifying the annexation of the Crimea due to it being an important step in improving Russian domestic security. Considering this, Ukraine and its allies were well aware of Russia’s change in attitude. This is not to say that Ukraine was certain that Russia would launch a full-scale invasion, rather that Ukraine and its allies were certainly wary of Russia and its sentiment toward Ukraine. 

After the annexation of the Crimea, it was clear that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were not prepared for a possible invasion from Russia. The state of the Ukrainian armed forces was far from the modern military that Ukraine wields today. Decades of budget cuts and corruption left the Ukrainian military in an unrecognisable state if the two were compared today. Due to the condition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia was able to annex the Crimea facing essentially no resistance. This served as a wake up call not only to Ukraine, but also to NATO and its allies. If Russian aggression could be enabled so easily, then the potential for other states to fall in Europe would become more of a realistic problem in the future. Ukraine alone could not hope to match the might of Russia's military, in 2014 Russia spent the equivalent of roughly $85 billion US dollars on their military. This accounted for 4.1% of their total GDP that year.Russia at the time boasted the second most powerful military on earth.

Ukraine required funding from outside sources to aid in the rebuilding of their military. It was in the interest of NATO and namely the US to increase efforts to aid the Ukrainian Armed Forces. By 2021, Ukraine had received $2.5 billion dollars from the US to aid in the modernisation of its military. The annexation of the Crimea was the catalyst for NATO enhancing support for Ukraine At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO stated that “In response to the conflict, NATO has also significantly stepped up its practical assistance to Ukraine. Immediate actions help Ukraine address the current conflict, and long-term measures build capacity, develop capabilities and contribute to a deep reform of the armed forces and the security sector.” This could be seen in effect through Operation Orbital for example, this operation was a British led effort to prepare members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for different combat scenarios.  There is no doubt that the Russian annexation of the Crimea was a driving factor behind the massive increase in NATO and Ukrainian cooperation. We can already begin to understand one of the factors that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv, a Ukrainian military brought up to western standards managed far better than Ukraine’s military would’ve without aid from NATO. 

Having established the importance that the annexation of the Crimea had in the modernisation and growth the Ukrainian Armed Forces underwent between 2014 and 2022, an analysis of the key military actions during and before the Battle for Kyiv can begin. 

According to the Congressional Research Service, significant troop numbers began building up on Ukraine’s border as early as October 2021. By January of 2022, large numbers of Russian troops and military equipment were reported in Belarus. A joint announcement was made by Russia and Belarus stating that the two nations were participating in joint military exercises together from February 9th to February 20th. These exercises would include both the Russian army and aerospace forces (VKS). Some notable Russian units, namely the Russian VDV (elite airborne units) and Russian Spetsnaz units were reported in Belarus. On the 6th of February 2022, The Guardian reported that “According to the NATO secretary general, Jens Stolenberg, Russia has deployed 30,000 combat troops, elite Spetsnaz units, Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 missile defence systems.” By the 18th of February 2022, The Guardian reported that there were as many as 190,000 troops on the borders of Ukraine. These 190,000 troops were split into so-called ‘combined arms armies’. Attacking Kyiv were 5 combined arms armies, each of which contained roughly 7000 personnel, meaning that roughly 35,000 members of the Russian Armed Forces were a part of the Battle for Kyiv. Throughout all three main axes of advancement into Ukraine, these combined arms armies were split into ‘battalion tactical groups’ (BTG). Each BTG contained between 700-800 personnel with some containing as much as 900 personnel. 

The Ukrainian high command believed that the main element of the Russian invasion would come from the Donbass region, as such the majority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were stationed in and around the Donbass region to counter any Russian advancements made from the East. Naturally, the Ukrainian high command did not neglect the defence of the Kyiv region, according to Dave Axe of Forbes there were roughly 20,000 Ukrainian troops ready to defend the Kyiv region from a potential Russian attack.  

The attack on the Kyiv region began with electronic warfare attacks to disrupt and damage Ukrainian communication, radar, and air defence systems. This was followed by a significant barrage of air-strikes alongside cruise missile strikes that targeted Ukrainian military installations, such as command centres, critical infrastructure, fuel storages and ammunition depots. These strikes did succeed in some instances, for example, according to RUSI, 75% of Ukrainian stationary air defences were engaged during the initial Russian barrage. This points to an accurate mapping of Ukrainian military installations conducted through Russian intelligence. Despite this evidence of Russian intelligence successfully identifying Ukrainian targets, there were areas in Ukraine that were hit that were former military targets years prior to February 24th. In the same report, RUSI noted that in regard to Russian targets “the Russian lists appeared to be linear and unresponsive to updated information.” This can be corroborated by the Russian campaign assessment conducted by the ISW on February 24th, the report states that “Russia did not successfully ground the Ukrainian air force or cripple the Ukrainian armed forces enabling several Ukrainian successes on February 24.” This demonstrates a clear failure at a tactical level in the Russian chain of command. The failure in the Russian chain of command between the strategic and intelligence elements resulted in Ukrainian forces being able to survive the initial surprise launch of the Russian air campaign and therefore remain in the fight to defend Kyiv.  

After the initial strike campaign, Russian units advanced on both the western and eastern banks  of the Dnipro river that runs through the middle of Kyiv. This can be seen in figure 1, a map displaying the assessed areas of Russian control on February 25th. 

As shown by figure 1, the Russian advance made up significant ground during the start of the full-scale military operation. By February 25th, some Russian units managed to reach the outskirts of the city of Kyiv. Russia was able to capture most of this territory due to Ukraine employing the concept of strategic depth into its strategy. Much of the land to the north of Kyiv is made up of forests and marshland, terrain such as is difficult to advance through. This was taken into account by General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who was in charge of the defence of Kyiv. Koberidze notes that “Syrsky organized two rings of defense, one in the outer suburbs of the city and one within the capital, with the goal of protecting the downtown area and keeping the Russians fighting on the approaches to Kyiv.” This was a great success, due to the employment of strategic depth, Ukraine was able to maintain stable lines of supply and communication despite the surprise attack of the Russian armed forces.

The failure of the initial Russian strikes to completely wipe out the Ukrainian Armed Forces ability to defend itself from the air would prove significant in one of the most important battles of the Kyiv offensive, the Battle for Hostomel airport. After the initial Russian strikes against Ukraine, troops of the VDV landed at Hostomel airport, 35 km from Kyiv. Hostomel was to be used as a base for the Russian advance on Kyiv, with the airport secured, Russian transport aircraft would have been able to ferry supplies to the BTGs moving towards Kyiv. The initial capture of the airport by the Russian Armed Forces was a success, although seven Russian helicopters were shot down in the process. Although the airport itself was captured, the VDV failed to stop the Ukrainian military from contesting the area throughout the period of Russian occupation. Without a fully secure airstrip, Russian transport aircraft would be unable to land and re-supply the units holding the airport due to the danger of being shot down. This fear was realised when Ukrainian artillery damaged the landing strip at Hostomel airport so badly that even if Russian transport aircraft could survive the journey to the airport, they would be unable to land due to the condition of the runway. The Battle for Hostomel concluded on the 25th of February, denying the Russian military a skybridge into the Kyiv region from which it could continue the supply of its troops driving on Kyiv. 

On the Eastern bank of the Dnipro river lies the city of Chernihiv as seen in figure 2, 95 km to the northeast of Kyiv. On the 24th of February Russian forces besieged the city in an effort to continue down the E95 highway toward Kyiv. The siege lasted for five weeks, until Ukrainian counter attacks successfully recaptured one of several main roads connecting Chernihiv to Kyiv, allowing for supplies and troops to flood in and aid in the defence of the city.

The defence of Chernihiv was vital to the Ukrainian victory at Kyiv, the defenders of Chernihiv and its wider region occupied the majority of Russian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro river, allowing for a somewhat stable situation on the eastern axis of attack. Crucially, Chernihiv bought time for the Ukrainian high command to structure the defence of the outer perimeter of Kyiv in accordance with the plan of General Syrsky. 

Close in proximity to Chernihiv is the city of Sumy, as in the case of Chernihiv it was a target of the Russian offensive toward Kyiv. From the very first day of the invasion, Sumy was in the firing line of the Russian Armed Forces. Sumy lies east of Chernihiv and was the eastmost area targeted in the Battle for Kyiv. The bulk of the Russian armed forces on this axis of attack were occupied attempting to take full control over the city. As seen in figure 3, Sumy was bypassed on two sides by Russian vanguard units with the objective of reaching Kyiv instead of committing resources to capturing the city itself. Fighting in Sumy occupied portions of the Russian Armed Forces until early April. It was in early April that the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv began. Considering this, the importance of the Battle for Sumy cannot be understated when considering the process of tying down Russian forces during the Battle for Kyiv. 

Despite the failed attempt to capture and secure the Hostomel airfield, Russian forces on the west bank of the Dnipro river were still advancing on Kyiv. After heavy fighting in the city of Ivankiv, Russian forces eventually broke through Ukrainian lines and began advancing south toward Kyiv. Russian units managed to force their way through the lines of the Ukrainian Armed Forces back past Hostomel that was now useless to the VKS. On February 27th, fighting in the now infamous suburbs of Irpin and Bucha began. These two towns were vital parts of the outer perimeter that General Syrskyi had established in response to the Russian invasion. The ISW reported that on the 27th of February, urban fighting had begun in the towns to the northwest of Kyiv. Over the course of two weeks, Russian forces had captured the town of Bucha, during which the occupying Russian forces killed roughly 1400 civilians during their occupation of the town. By March 14th roughly half of Irpin was under Russian control. The fighting in Irpin was constant, two weeks after the 14th, Ukrainian forces recaptured Irpin and three days later Bucha too was liberated. By standing their ground in Irpin, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had exhausted Russian forces on the west bank of the Dnipro, enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces to begin their counter attack and liberate the occupied areas of the Kyiv region as shown in figure 3. These counter attacks would eventually oust the last of the Russian Armed Forces from Kyiv by April 2nd 2022. 

Chapter 2: 

The Six Requirements for a Successful Offensive: 

Conducting large scale military operations requires large amounts of planning and preparation in order for the military in question to have the highest chance of success. This chapter will discuss successful military campaigns and analyse what the key factors are to a successful military offensive. Although all military campaigns are different, there are some distinct features that many successful military offensives share. Although successful is a loose term, in this case, a successful military operation would be one that achieved all, if not the majority of the goals that it set out to achieve before conducting an offensive. In regard to the Battle for Kyiv, Russia planned to capture the capital in a timeframe of three to four days. Capturing Kyiv was the primary goal of the Russian forces advancing on either side of the Dnipro river, the capture of Kyiv would enable the Russian Armed Forces to achieve their secondary goal of the invasion, that being to topple the Ukrainian government and replace President Zelensky with a pro-Russian leader.  

Despite the ever advancing capabilities of militaries across the world, the requirements of a successful offensive have proved to be relatively timeless. One of the most studied generals in history, Sun Tzu laid out five key elements for conducting warfare,one of these elements, generalship, described the five key features that should be considered before waging war. The first of these five elements was intelligence. Good intelligence has been a requirement of all successful military offensives throughout history. Without intelligence, military offensives would be conducted without any information on the state and capabilities of the enemy. Naturally, failing to gather accurate intelligence puts an invading force at a severe disadvantage. According to Andrew Marshal, “Military intelligence, also known as defence intelligence, is a military discipline that uses information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and correction to commanders in support of their decisions.” Gathering information on the whereabouts of enemy military installations for example is key to a force preparing to invade the territory of an enemy. Without the correct intelligence, lethal force would not be able to be applied to areas that the invading force would require it. According to the 2017 British Army doctrine report, intelligence is the force that commands the actions of the troops on the ground(4). This highlights the importance of military intelligence during offensive actions, other factors that determine the success of military operations such as logistics and strategy rely first on intelligence so that other elements of a successful operation can be implemented effectively.. A report on the successes and failures of military intelligence during Operation Desert Storm found that “locating and destroying mobile Scud missile launchers on the ground in Iraq proved to be a vexing problem.” This example highlights the importance intelligence maintains during a military operation, it can be misconceived that intelligence only serves a purpose before the beginning of a military offensive. This demonstrates the first requirement of a successful military offensive, without adequate intelligence, the probability of an offensive succeeding becomes very low

Almost equal to intelligence in importance is the matter of logistics. As stated by Koberidze, “Any war’s Achilles heel is logistics. The logistical challenges for military forces entering adversary territory with strategic depth are exacerbated.” This statement perfectly encapsulates the difficulty of maintaining strong logistical capabilities for a force advancing through enemy territory. Logistics are the unseen lifeline to military operations of any size, it would be impossible for a military to conduct any sort of operation without the means to conduct said operation. For example, soldiers on the frontline require ammunition, food, means of communication, first aid equipment, and clothing. These needs cannot be met by the soldiers as they are advancing toward an objective. The vehicles they are using require ammunition, fuel, and maintenance. All of these needs must be met even during offensive operations. Without good logistical capabilities, an army cannot continue to fight at a level required to capture an objective. A great historical example of this comes from the infamous Battle of Stalingrad, where the Wehrmacht overstretched their supply lines in an effort to capture the city of Stalingrad in a rapid manner. The supply lines could not keep up with the rapidly advancing military and therefore the fighting capabilities of the Wehrmacht decreased significantly thus leading to the German defeat at the battle. General Dwight D Eisenhower, former supreme allied commander of Europe during the second world war, once stated that “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” Maintaining a strong logistical capability throughout an offensive, is key to the success of a military campaign. Loose comparisons can be drawn in a logistical sense between the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kyiv, rapid advancements must be supported by a cohort of logistical aid to ensure the best chance of success during a military offensive. Considering this, the difficulties the Russian Armed Forces faced in regard to logistics were immense.

Establishing a strong chain of command is another requirement for a successful military offensive, ensuring that a stable command structure can be maintained is vital to a successful military offensive, as demonstrated by the example of US military intelligence during Operation Desert Storm, constant intelligence updates are required in order for an advancing force to continue to engage key enemy positions. This information cannot be passed on from commanders to their soldiers on the ground without a properly established chain of command. The chain of command allows for accurate information to be passed down in order for primary mission objectives to be met. An established chain of command also works in the opposite direction, allowing for soldiers to feedback on orders or request more aid for example. The primary role of the chain of command is to allow for the exchange of information between different levels of a military offensive. It is a prerequisite of any successful military to have a well oiled chain of command, modern technology aids in this tremendously. Through advancements in technology, information can be transferred between the necessary units at tremendous speed, thus making an invading force more efficient in the military operations that it conducts. 

The tactical level of a military offensive is vital to the outcome of an operation. Without sound tactical decision making, key points of battles can be lost. Although there is a lot of tactical variation when it comes to engagements between two opposing forces, there are a few independent variables that are requirements to succeed on a tactical level during an offensive. The first of these being to maintain fire superiority over an enemy, this is to ensure that during engagements, opposing forces can be suppressed through superior firepower. According to Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, both senior defence analysts for the RAND corporation, there is a heavy emphasis in Russian doctrine to achieve fire superiority over an enemy in order to disrupt and overwhelm the enemy during engagements. This can be supported by Russian actions from the Siege of Grozny to the Siege of Mariupol. Russian forces abide strictly to the rule of achieving fire superiority over an enemy, this is typically done through the use of Russia’s extensive inventory of artillery. A second independent variable on the tactical level of military offensives is the requirement of gaining the initiative over an enemy. Achieving this, ensures that an invading force can dictate the course of events during battle. Ensuring that an invading force can perform to the required standards at a tactical level is essential for a successful military offensive. This is because military doctrine is based on the current capabilities a military possesses. For example, in the case of Russia, a military that has a substantial number of artillery pieces and the ammunition required for said pieces, doctrine will rely heavily on the use of artillery at the tactical level. Having established the ability of a military force, tactical doctrine can be developed in accordance to the capabilities that a military force possesses. Failing to follow tactical doctrine would mean discarding the greatest strengths that a fighting force possesses, and therefore lowering the chances of a victorious outcome. 

Perhaps one of the more underlooked requirements for a successful military operation is morale. Due to the fact that it is intangible, it can often be disregarded as a factor leading to a successful military operation. In 2018 RAND published two reports for the US army describing the will to fight. The report stated that “The best technology in the world is useless without the force of will to use it and to keep using it even as casualties mount and unexpected calamities arise.” This statement highlights the importance of morale, without the will to fight, military offensives cannot be conducted. However, morale of the enemy is perhaps more important than the morale of one's own soldiers when conducting an offensive. Throughout history, morale has affected the outcome of seemingly untenable situations in battles across the globe. For example, during the first world war, fighting around the French fort of Verdun lasted for months. Many expected the French to crumble under the pressure of the German offensive and surrender the fort to the German Army. It was assessed that the French could not withstand the scale of the German offensive and would eventually collapse. It was assumed that the morale of the French soldiers would eventually betray the French High Command and lead to a defeat at the Battle of Verdun. This was not the case, thanks in part to morale, the French were victorious at Verdun. This example shows that underestimating the morale of the enemy is a very dangerous mistake to make in wartime. Morale is a factor that should not be underestimated, without morale, a military’s soldiers will not fight and underestimating the morale of the enemy can lead to miscalculations about the correct measures to employ when fighting said enemy. 

Suitable strategy is the last requirement for a successful military operation, strategy commands the direction that an offensive takes. Although the effects are not as quick to set in as tactical operations, a strategy shapes the entirety of an offensive, rather than just individual points during an offensive. It goes without saying that a good strategy is required in order for a military offensive to be successful. According to the Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies,in a militaristic sense, strategy can be defined as “a plan for using military means to achieve a political end.”  Using this definition, strategy can be considered an essential component of any military offensive. Given that strategy is the theory of the successful implementation of military actions to achieve a political goal, the importance of it cannot be understated. A good strategy must be based on an analysis of the capabilities of both one’s own military and the opponent facing it. Having established the capabilities of each side, a good strategy would exploit potential weaknesses found within an enemy's forces whilst simultaneously protecting the weak points in one’s own military from exploitation. The same journal introduced a theory that good military strategists could manipulate characteristics of warfare to be in favour of one’s own forces. For example, a strategy for a military offensive might prioritise a small time frame for an offensive to take place as a means to achieve a victory without numerous losses of personnel and equipment. Strategy shapes the outcome of offensives and is a major requirement for any successful offensive. 

These six requirements: intelligence, logistics, chain of command, tactics, morale, and strategy are the key requirements for conducting a successful military offensive. These six factors can be grouped into two different levels of importance. At the lower level the three requirements are the chain of command, tactics and morale. These three factors are certainly important, without them a military offensive would be far more likely to fail than succeed. In particular, morale is underestimated in its influence on the outcome of military offensives, as previously stated without the will to fight a nation’s military capabilities are essentially useless. The chain of command is also a very important aspect of a successful military offensive. In contemporary warfare, information is invaluable, having the infrastructure to share information quickly and efficiently is a vital component of any military offensive. The importance of tactics does not need to be overexplained, of course it is the actions on the battlefield that influence the outcome of offensives, but given that there are only a few independent variables when it comes to the implementation of military tactics such as achieving fire superiority over an enemy, in most cases tactics rely on the current situation in order to respond correctly. In the other group of intelligence, logistics, and strategy, there is no clear factor that bears more importance than the others. These three factors are the most important requirements for a successful military offensive. The three are intertwined, for example logistics shapes strategy just as intelligence is influenced by strategy. These three factors are the most important to a successful military offensive. 

Chapter Three: 

A Review of Russian Performance During the Battle for Kyiv:

Having established the six essential requirements for a successful military operation, we can compare the Russian performance during the Battle for Kyiv against these factors to determine where the failures in Russia’s offensive stemmed from. 

Russian intelligence could be considered a failure during the Battle for Kyiv, although the VKS saw some success in destroying key Ukrainian military installations, it failed to completely disable Ukrainian networks of defence during the initial strikes of the Battle for Kyiv. Russia failing to destroy enough Ukrainian air defence systems, despite the advantage the element of surprise provided the Russian Armed Forces, alongside the abundance of munitions it was able to strike Ukraine with, Ukrainian air defence systems remained active to a capacity that enabled them to repel enough of the VKS’ attacks and therefore defend key Ukrainian military assets. The most prominent example of this was seen at the Battle for Hostomel, Ukrainian air defences were able to down Russian transport aircraft attempting to land at the airfield after the initial Russian capture. This had a massive influence on the wider battle for Kyiv as it denied the Russian forces a skybridge from which it could supply its drive on Kyiv with. Another Russian failure in regard to intelligence was revealed after Ukrainian and Russian forces first met on the battlefield. According to Rob Johnson, “Russian prisoners and intercepted communications revealed they thought the Ukrainians would greet them as liberators.” This demonstrates a total failure from Russian intelligence in regard to the information passed onto the troops leading the advancement toward Kyiv. This intelligence failure often resulted in Russian troops being completely surprised that they were taking incoming fire from Ukrainian positions despite the fact that they were invading the nation. Some observers also reported that captured Russian maps were extremely outdated, some maps were found to be from the days of the Soviet Union. Given that this invasion began over thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, this is an astounding lack of due care from Russian military intelligence. Not having access to modern maps of Ukrainian roads and towns often resulted in Russian troop movements getting bogged down, forced down narrow roads or through towns that contained elements of the Ukrainian armed forces laying ready to conduct ambushes. These are three of the most prominent examples of Russian intelligence failures during the Battle for Kyiv. 

When compared to the intelligence the Armed Forces of Ukraine possessed during the Battle for Kyiv, the Russian Armed Forces frankly looked amateur. Although much of Ukrainian intelligence was supplemented through western intelligence services, it still performed at a much higher level than its Russian counterparts. 

Russian logistics were also a colossal failure during the Battle for Kyiv. Johnson states in his report that “Each advance appeared to compete against the others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics and air support.” This suggests that from the beginning of the Battle for Kyiv, Russian forces had not prepared for the potential need for replenishments of vital components of an offensive, such as fuel and ammunition as Russian forces pushed on toward Kyiv. Russian forces failed to complete one of the fundamental steps in preparing for an offensive, that being to ensure that the invading forces are supplied with what is required alongside extra resources in the event of a prolonged offensive. As discussed in chapter two, logistics are the backbone of any military action, especially when going on the offensive. According to Dara Massicot “Moscow stretched its logistics and support systems to the breaking point.” This can be evidenced by the numerous reports of Russian forces having to abandon their vehicles due to running out of fuel. The failure on a logistical level was immense, without the proper means to sustain an invasion, it is doomed to fail. Russia’s military before the Battle for Kyiv was renowned for having an abundance of fuel, ammunition and support vehicles that could support Russian military actions for long periods of time. Considering this, one has to look inwardly at the Russian Armed Forces as an organisation. It is no secret that corruption is a widespread issue in the Russian Armed Forces, however it does not justify the total failures of the Russian Armed Forces to supply its troops with adequate supplies to conduct a successful military offensive. Moreover, the evident logistical errors were rarely rectified during the roughly month-long campaign that Russia waged in order to capture Kyiv. The Russian failure in a logistical sense was total, Russian planning clearly ignored the importance a strong logistical base has as a factor leading to a successful military offensive. 

The Russian chain of command failed mainly due to the mismanagement of the battalion tactical groups. Russia’s military relied heavily on the structures left in place from the Soviet Union. The idea of Russian tactical groups emerged roughly a decade ago, although conceived with the idea that smaller groups would be more efficient in conducting military operations, poor chain of command in the BTGs led to failures throughout the Battle for Kyiv. This can be attributed to the scale of the conflict. In comparison to the organisation of the Russian military during the times of the Soviet Union, it was understood that any conventional conflict the military would be involved in would be of a large scale. For example, a direct conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. After the end of the cold war, it was clear that military conflicts would scale down to a smaller level. This led to the development of the BTG, Russian doctrine proved to be effective during the conflict in the Donbass due to the small-scale nature of the fighting. The Kyiv offensive was of a much larger scale, the Russian chain of command failed to adapt to this and maintained the stance that BTGs were the most efficient size of personnel grouping at conducting an offensive operation. Unlike many western militaries, the Russian Armed Forces maintain an outdated top-down command structure. Soldiers are rarely able to use their own initiatives during combat, instead having to achieve their objective set through a set procedure. This is an evident disregard of the importance that an efficient chain of command has on the outcome of a military operation. This can be supported by an article by the European Council on Foreign Relations that states “The inadequate training and incompetence of Russian military personnel - combines with the strict hierarchies in which they operated, which left officers incapable of acting on their own initiative - meant that they were unable to quickly coordinate advances deep into enemy territory.” This demonstrates a clear failure in the chain of command of the Russian armed forces, without feedback from soldiers on the ground, alongside officers being unable to take initiative on the battlefield we can observe a total failure in the Russian chain of command. 

At a tactical level, the Russian Armed Forces performed fairly well considering the difficulties in conducting a military offensive when the majority of the requirements of a successful military offensive are not met. This can be supported by the progression of the frontlines shown in Figures 1 and 3. Although Russian forces had numerical superiority over the Ukrainian Armed Forces it was not at the ratio that successful offensives have. A general rule of conventional warfare is that an attacking force requires a numerical advantage at a ratio of 3:1 in order to achieve a breakthrough(9). As previously stated in chapter one, estimates of the total number of Russian personnel engaged in the Battle for Kyiv was roughly 35,000. The Ukrainian Armed Forces had roughly 20,000 troops deployed in the Kyiv region throughout the Battle for Kyiv meaning that Russia needed 25,000 more troops in the Kyiv region in order to meet the ideal ratio of 3:1. Although much of the Russian success can be attributed to the Russian strategy of rapid advancement, success at a tactical level was required for any ground to be captured. There were only a few instances of Russian tactical blunders during the Battle for Kyiv, perhaps the most impactful was the infamous 64 km long convoy that stalled on the drive toward Kyiv. For the most part, this can be blamed on the poor logistical structure of the Russian Armed Forces during the offensive, but nonetheless failing to respond in a manner that could salvage the situation was indeed a tactical failure. Overall, at a tactical level, the Russian Armed Forces performed well during the Kyiv offensive, especially when taking into account the lack of a 3:1 ratio. 

Measuring the morale of the Russian Armed Forces during the Battle for Kyiv would be impossible. As morale is intangible it cannot be quantified and therefore an analysis on Russian morale would be subjective. However, as stated in chapter two, the morale of an opponent can often be more important to the outcome of an offensive than the morale of the attacking force. It is clear that Russia grossly underestimated the morale of not only the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but also the civilian population as well. Although not as important as the morale of the armed forces, the morale of the civilian population cannot be underestimated, especially during the Battle for Kyiv. There are numerous examples of civilians resisting the Russian invasion with the tools available to them at the time, for example there were a few instances during the Battle for Kyiv of civilians throwing molotov-cocktails at Russian military personnel and vehicles. Alongside this on the first day of the invasion, civilians gathered in their thousands to form territorial defence brigades to aid in the resistance of the Russian invasion. Considering the intelligence failures of the Russian Armed Forces and the example of Russian soldiers believing that they would be welcomed into Ukraine as liberators, the shock of the complete opposite response would certainly have influenced the morale of the Russian Armed Forces during the Battle for Kyiv. Although the morale of the Russian Armed Forces cannot be reviewed, the morale of the Ukrainian military and wider civilian population was severely underestimated by the Russian High Command. This may have had an influence on not only Russian strategy, but also logistical elements to the Russian offensive. 

Russian strategy for the Battle for Kyiv was based on poor intelligence, an over confidence in the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, especially the effectiveness of BTGs and a severe underestimation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A strategy based upon these misconceptions was almost pre-destined to fail. Perhaps the biggest failure of Russian strategy at the Battle for Kyiv was the expectation of a Ukrainian capitulation within days of the start of the Battle for Kyiv. Having a strategy reliant on an outcome that could not be guaranteed was a massive miscalculation on the part of the Russian High Command, it is clear from the evidence from chapter one, that a rapid assault on Kyiv was the primary goal of the Russian strategy during the Kyiv offensive. This can be supported by Scott Boston and Dara Massicot’s report on the Russian way of warfare, an extract from the report reads “Given Russia’s conventional weaknesses in a protracted war with a peer or near-peer adversary, it will attempt to use indirect action strategies and asymmetric responses across multiple domains to mitigate perceived imbalances. Russia will attempt to terminate a conflict quickly.” This must be taken into account when reviewing the Russian strategy for the Battle of Kyiv, Russia always sought a quick end to the conflict, this suggests that the Russian High Command was well aware of the pitfalls of the Russian military and its ability to conduct large scale military operations. It is likely that the Russian High Command incorrectly gambled on a quick victory that did not expose the issues that were revealed to the rest of the world after the initial set timeframe for the Russian invasion ran out. Considering that the Russian High Command was aware of the weaknesses that protracted conflict would expose, we can come to the conclusion that the Russian strategy for the Battle for Kyiv was based largely on a gamble that Ukrainian forces would not be able to withstand the initial wave of Russian strikes on the nation. This can be evidenced by the lack of a contingency plan that Russia had in relation to the potential failure at the Battle for Hostomel. Given that a major part of the Russian strategy relied on supplies being able to be flown directly to the frontline. This has proven to be a monumental mistake that has impacted not only the outcome of the Battle for Kyiv, but also the direction of the rest of the war as well. The Russian strategy based largely on a gamble was a major error, this has been reflected in the result of the Battle for Kyiv. 

This review has identified the errors and successes in relation to the six key factors of a successful military offensive, of these the two most prominent errors come from the intelligence failures of the Russian military, and the massive strategic miscalculation that forced Russia to not only prolong a conflict that it did not wish to, but also to conceded defeat at the Battle for Kyiv.  

Conclusion:

This dissertation analysed the failures of the Russian Armed Forces and the factors that led to its defeat at the Battle for Kyiv. My initial hypothesis highlighted two factors that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle of Kyiv. These two factors were the underestimation of the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the poor Russian strategy that was followed. Whilst both of these are valid in regard to their significance as factors that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle of Kyiv, it is an undeveloped answer to the question this thesis aimed to answer.

Each chapter contributed significantly to the outcome of this dissertation, although there were little conclusions to take from the first chapter, it was essential to address they key events and military actions before and during the Battle for Kyiv, this was an essential step to answering the question at hand as it provided a means of not only understanding when and what key events occurred during the Kyiv offensive, but also information to compare to chapter two. Without an outline of the key events before and during the Battle for Kyiv, the goal to provide a relatively comprehensive assessment of why the Russian Armed Forces were beaten so soundly at Kyiv, would not be achieved. This is because the next two chapters were dedicated to identifying the requirements of a successful offensive and then comparing the actions of the Russian Armed Forces against these requirements.

Chapter two was focused on establishing the six requirements of a successful offensive. The goal of this chapter was to analyse the importance of the six factors discussed in order to compare the actions of the Russian military against said requirements in the next chapter. 

Chapter three brought chapters one and two together, having established the key events in chapter one and the requirements of a successful military offensive in chapter two, chapter three was able to draw from both when reviewing the performance of the Russian armed forces at the Battle for Kyiv. 

Structuring this dissertation this way enabled the goal of filling the gap in research about the Battle for Kyiv through the completion of an analysis of the Battle for Kyiv that provides not only a timeline and analysis of key events, but also an analysis on the requirements for a successful offensive. Given that this dissertation sought to analyse the failures of the Russian Armed Forces and the factors that led to its defeat in the Battle for Kyiv, this structure was not only justified, but also optimal for the goal of this thesis. 

Through the findings of the research presented in this dissertation, we can establish an answer to the question that was set out to be answered. To begin, a prerequisite for the Russian failure must be discussed, that being the failures of the Russian military intelligence during the Battle for Kyiv. As stated in chapter two, intelligence shapes strategy, considering the strategy employed by the Russian High Command, the start of the failures of the Russian Armed Forces begins with the failures of Russian intelligence to gather both correct and relevant information that would be passed on to the Russian High Command. 

Although influenced by intelligence, the Russian strategy is the most influential factor that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle of Kyiv, the main issue with the overall Russian strategy lies in the massive gamble that the Russian High Command took with its plan to seize the capital of Ukraine in a matter of days. The overconfidence in this plan enabled failures in the other four key requirements for conducting a successful military offensive. Although informed through poor intelligence, the assumption that Ukrainian forces would capitulate because of the perceived capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces before the invasion was an awful example of overconfidence. 

The underestimation of Ukrainian morale was directly influenced by Russian intelligence, as mentioned in chapter three, Russian soldiers seemed unaware of how they were perceived by the majority of the Ukrainian population after launching their invasion. This misconception not only influenced the poor strategic choices made by the Russian High Command, but also the morale of the Russian troops after finding out the hard way that they were not welcome in the Kyiv region. 

The failure of the Russian Armed Forces to establish a strong logistical system that could support the rapid advancement on Kyiv certainly was a key factor in the Russian defeat. Although also influenced by the flawed strategic goals of the Russian High Command, logistical failures often resulted in the tactical element of the Battle for Kyiv being affected due to problems such as a lack of fuel or ammunition. As stated in chapter two, logistics are the Achilles’ heel of military offensives. 

The tactical element of the Russian performance at the Battle for Kyiv was at a high standard in the majority of cases. Proof of this lies in the rapid advancements made in a short period of time against a well equipped foe. The tactical performance of the Russian military was hardly a factor in their eventual defeat at the Battle for Kyiv. 

The failures in the Russian chain of command are not a unique issue in regard to the Russian performance at the Battle for Kyiv. In accordance with Russian doctrine, a top down method of command is the set standard for the Russian chain of command. This was no different during the Battle for Kyiv, it had little bearing on the outcome of the battle due to the fact that despite the outcome, the formation of the Russian chain of command would not have changed. 

Having reviewed the Russian failures we can come to the conclusion that the biggest factor that led to the Russian defeat at the Battle for Kyiv was the poor strategic choices made by the Russian high command. This is followed in second place by the failures of Russian military intelligence, as previously stated intelligence shapes strategy and strategy shapes the other four key factors. The poor results of Russian intelligence influenced the poor strategic decisions of the Russian High Command and therefore the failures in the elements of logistics and morale during the Battle for Kyiv. The tactical element and the chain of command are less influential factors due to the reasons previously stated. Through the failures of strategy and intelligence, the other four elements of a successful military offensive were doomed to fail. This is exactly what happened at the Battle for Kyiv.

This dissertation has achieved the goal of filling a gap in the research about the Battle for Kyiv and the reasons behind the Russian defeat.