Have Three Years of War in Ukraine has Strengthened Russia’s Military?:

Have Three Years of War in Ukraine has Strengthened Russia’s Military?:

It is no secret that the first year of the ongoing war in Ukraine was nothing short of disastrous for Russia and its military. Vladimir Putin and the Russian high command did not expect the so-called ‘special military operation’ to last for more than two weeks. Three years later, a heavily wounded Russia’s prospects of achieving some sort of victory in Ukraine look stronger than ever. 

Russia’s total defeat in the Battle for Kyiv left military analysts puzzled, for a nation once considered a near peer adversary for the United States, such a convincing defeat dealt by the Armed Forces of Ukraine had many questioning if this once great power had become a paper tiger. Enormous losses paired with heavy economic sanctions from a then unified western world left Russia with a choice, to cut their losses and lay claim to the annexed land in the Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine; or double down and plunge into a war of attrition. After a so-called ‘gesture of goodwill’ that saw Russia retreat from the Kyiv oblast, their focus shifted Eastward. The already war-torn Eastern region of Ukraine was a safe bet for the Russian high command. The territory in the east of Ukraine is more suited for the familiar Russian way of war, to press a numerical advantage over and over until the enemy is exhausted. 

Russia’s approach in the North of Ukraine was similar in nature to its attempt to encircle Kyiv just as they attempted to encircle Grozny 28 years prior. In an analysis of the war in Chechnya,  A rand corporation analyst noted that “it appeared that the Russian operational design was to drive in deep and encircle all the major population centers.” This approach was also noted in the Battle for Kyiv, Russian forces approached the city on both sides of the Dnipro river - see Figure 1. (Below)

Figure 1

This approach was also seen to a lesser extent in the Soviet-Afghan war. Scott R. McMichael wrote that “This latter kind of warfare is characterized doctrinally by deep offensive operations carried out by heavy tank-mechanized formations, massed and echeloned to conduct breaches of dense defenses… The doctrine seeks a quick, decisive victory” 

In the three aforementioned examples above, this deep-driving Russian approach was never entirely successful, albeit for different reasons. Despite this, the fact still remains that Russia’s attempt at a decisive victory in Ukraine was wholly unsuccessful. 

After the defeat at Kyiv, it was clear that this approach would not work against an enemy as well prepared and motivated as the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It begged the question in the Russian high command. What would be more likely to bring about a victory? Shifting focus to the East. Although at present, the exact reasons behind this shift are unclear, we can postulate on the factors behind the eastward shift that has allowed the Russian army to slowly advance consistently in the East. Through doing this, we can determine how the Russian army has grown stronger even after the grueling three years of war it has endured. 

Perhaps the most obvious reason is the terrain. Compared to the areas of dense forest and marshland that the north of Ukraine is so famous for, the east of Ukraine with its rolling hills and vast plains makes for a far more attractive option for an invading force. The armed forces of Ukraine utilised the terrain in the north with ambushes on Russian forces being extremely common in the first months of the war. When taking into account the Russian reliance on numerical superiority, even an attritional war over flat terrain in the east is much more favourable to the Russian Armed Forces. This can be evidenced by both the battles for Bakhmut and Avdiivka where the famous Russian adage of quantity being a quality all of its own rung true. 

Far enough away from potential Ukrainian strikes, the bulk of Russia’s defense industry has been ramping up production across all fronts. U.S Army General Christopher Cavoli, the commander of U.S European command (EUCOM) has testified that the Russian armed forces are growing. Despite an estimated 900,000 casualties sustained so far, currently Russia has an estimated 600,000 troops on the contact line today. According to EUCOM, the Russian army is mustering 30,000 new recruits every month. 

Having committed to a war in the east, Russia's wartime economy has held up surprisingly well against the mountain of sanctions that were placed upon the nation. Prioritizing the defense sector of the Russian economy will certainly be felt in other areas of Russia’s economy, but at the front the focus on defense is well received. So much focus has been placed on the defense sector in fact, that at present, the Russian army is larger than it was at the beginning of the war. It is clear to see how Russia going all in its war with Ukraine has strengthened their position on the battlefield. 

Despite sanctions from numerous nations around the world, wartime production in Russia thanks to its wartime economy is at an all time high. The US estimates that Russia is producing 250,000 artillery shells a month. This number dwarves anything that western defense industries are producing. This paired with aid, namely from China, North Korea and Iran, leaves Russia in a tolerable scenario in regard to its production of arms. 

In three years of conflict, both sides have learned valuable lessons. Warfare has evolved, from the deployment of FPV (first person view) drones to the development of trench warfare tactics. The Russian armed forces have gained invaluable experience during its time fighting in Ukraine. Although the same can be said for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, when considering the rate at which Russia is not only replenishing its forces, but expanding them knowledge from seasoned veterans will have no doubt been passed down to many new recruits entering the frontlines. 

In view of the factors above, one would be forgiven for questioning why Russia hasn't steamrolled its way to Kyiv yet. The factors above compliment Russia nicely. The terrain suits its numerical advantage, its economy is centered around war and it has gained experience at an enormous cost. It cannot be forgotten that the situation that Russia finds itself in is not a pleasant one. NATO has expanded, the majority of its armed forces are tied up in Ukraine and on the global stage in spite of Putin’s posturing, Russia is running out of time. 

Against all that has impacted it, the Russian Armed Forces and its defense sector have for the most part withstood what has been thrown against it. In spite of all the means that Russia has gone to to try and achieve its goals in Ukraine, progress is slow. Progress is Progress nonetheless, but at the current rates of advance, the Russian Armed Forces are going to have to conjure up much more than they have done so far if they are to defeat Ukraine. 

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